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This thematic issue of American Studies in Scandinavia discusses the rise 
of American conservatism since World War II and the way issues dear to 
conservatives increasingly shaped the political conversation and legislative 
agenda in the United States. The Age of Franklin Roosevelt, with shared 
prosperity and an expansion of the role of government in welfare and eco-
nomic activities, came to an end in the late 1970s and has been replaced 
by the Age of Ronald Reagan, an era of deregulation of business, tax cuts, 
and a renewed focus on self-reliance. In spite of the election of Barack 
Obama in 2008, the Age of Reagan is arguably still ongoing. The House 
of Representatives is led by conservative Republicans, and conservatives 
in the Senate have repeatedly filibustered Democratic legislative proposals. 
The Supreme Court has a majority of conservative justices. The Affordable 
Care Act, President Obama’s signature legislative accomplishment, does 
not have a public option and is based on ideas initiated by Republicans.
In the middle of the 20th century it did not seem likely that conservatism 
would strongly influence the trajectory of American politics in subsequent 
decades. In 1950 American literary critic Lionel Trilling claimed that “liber-
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alism is not only the dominant, but even the sole, intellectual tradition” in the 
U.S. According to Trilling, conservatism did not have fully developed ideas, 
but was expressed in “irritable mental gestures.”1 During the decades after 
Trilling made his observation, conservatism would definitely shape the di-
rection of American politics. The four articles in this special issue represent 
different aspects of conservatism. Niels Bjerre-Poulsen examines the roots 
of modern American conservatism and the early post-war mobilization of 
the conservative movement. Tom Packer discusses the role of North Caro-
lina Senator Jesse Helms in crafting a foreign policy that reflects the values 
of the conservative movement. Hilde Løvdal Stephens analyzes the signifi-
cance of evangelical parenting and tension between the Christian values of 
evangelicals and the increasing degree of secularism of public schools. Leif 
Magne Lervik assesses the challenge of guns on college campuses in the 
aftermath of important, recent Supreme Court decisions on the 2nd Amend-
ment. The paragraphs below will contextualize these four articles.
When President Lyndon B. Johnson defeated Arizona Senator Barry 
Goldwater in a landslide in the 1964 presidential election, scholars and 
journalists saw the election results as a repudiation of the ideas of the con-
servative movement, and columnist James Reston of The New York Times 
argued that “Barry Goldwater not only lost the presidential election yes-
terday but the conservative cause as well.”2 Reston would be mistaken. In 
subsequent decades conservatives would mobilize and capture the Repub-
lican Party. The GOP would win five of the six presidential elections from 
1968 to 1988, seize control of both chambers of Congress in the 1994 mid-
term elections, enact large tax cuts and policies of deregulation during the 
presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, and also influence the 
views of the Democratic Party on economic policy, specifically during the 
presidency of Bill Clinton. 
How was all this possible? It took decades to establish what Sidney Blu-
menthal has called the “Conservative Counter-Establishment.”3 Ideas were 
disseminated and political strategists helped build a social movement. In 
1 Quoted in John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 43.
2 Quoted in Lee Edwards, Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub-
lishing, Inc., 1995), p. 344.
3 Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Pow-
er (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).
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his article, Niels Bjerre-Poulsen points out that there were three factions 
among conservatives: libertarians, traditionalists, and anti-Communists. 
Anti-Communism was the glue that helped unite the disparate strands of 
libertarianism and traditionalism. The conservatism of Russell Kirk, in-
spired by Edmund Burke’s belief in institutions, order and religious values, 
was not easy to reconcile with the libertarian views of Friedrich Hayek that 
emphasized laissez-faire capitalism and the danger of state planning. In his 
2002 book Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement, 
1945-65, Bjerre-Poulsen describes the process of coalescing libertarians 
and traditionalists as “fusing ice and fire.”4 Yet both factions repudiated the 
New Deal’s expansion of the federal government apparatus and sought to 
take the United States in a new political direction.  
Founder of National Review William Buckley played a highly signifi-
cant role as a facilitator in unifying different types of conservatives. Both 
libertarians and traditionalists were welcome to write articles on behalf of 
the magazine. Moreover, as Bjerre-Poulsen argues in his article, Buckley 
served as a gatekeeper, refusing to embrace the positions of right-wing 
groups that were located outside of mainstream American conservatism, 
such as the John Birch Society. Bjerre-Poulsen contends that the modern 
Republican Party no longer has any gatekeeper that matches Buckley’s stat-
ure, and he points out that the John Birch Society was a co-sponsor of the 
annual Conservative Political Action Conference (C-PAC) in 2010.
The 1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater was important in 
shifting the gravity of the Republican Party from the Northeast towards the 
South and the West. Bjerre-Poulsen discusses the significance of Goldwa-
ter’s victory in the states of the Deep South for the “southernization” of the 
Republican Party. Nixon and Reagan could build on the work of Goldwater 
in order to attract racially conservative white southerners. The South was 
transformed from a Democratic stronghold to Republican territory, first in 
presidential elections and subsequently in congressional elections.5
Moreover, the Goldwater campaign was significant in bringing together 
many young ideological conservatives who would become key political 
strategists and activists in the emerging New Right of the 1970s. The mobi-
4 Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement: 1945-65 (Copenha-
gen: Museum Tusculanum Press/University of Copenhagen, 2002), ch. 2.
5 See Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). 
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lization of the conservatives in the 1970s was partly a reaction against the 
social tension of the 1960s and partly an effect of the disillusionment with 
President Richard Nixon’s domestic policies. In office Nixon would govern 
from the middle, and the large Democratic majority in Congress made it 
virtually impossible to enact conservative economic policies. In spite of 
nominating conservative justices to the Supreme Court, Nixon did little to 
break with the Great Society policies of Johnson, and the federal govern-
ment’s regulatory capacity was expanded considerably with the establish-
ment of the Environmental Protection Agency (1970), The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (1970), the National Traffic Safety Com-
mission (1970), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (1973). 
A significant event that spawned the campaign by conservatives to roll 
back the liberal regulatory agenda was the widespread circulation of a 
memorandum by Lewis Powell in 1971 on behalf of the Chamber of Com-
merce. Powell, who would soon be appointed by Nixon to the Supreme 
Court, claimed that the American system of free enterprise was under at-
tack, and that business leaders needed to organize to fight back. According 
to French reporter Eric Laurent, the memo “sketched out a strategy to be 
adopted not merely to reconquer the power and influence that had been 
lost, but also to establish an enduring domination over American politics 
and society.”6 Business leaders certainly took Powell’s warning seriously, 
and already the year after, the Business Roundtable of influential CEOs 
was founded. As sociologist Jerome Himmelstein points out, the emer-
gence of the Roundtable is particularly interesting due to the “historical 
fragmentation of business lobbying.” The Roundtable represented most 
of the large corporations and “combined lobbying on discrete issues with 
broad-gauged policy-making.”7 During the 1970s business groups would 
mobilize through political action committees and lobbying organizations. 
Entrepreneurs Richard Mellon Scaife and Joseph Coors were important for 
the funding of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Wash-
ington, D.C. that was established in 1973.
In the mid-1970s a group of political strategists formed what they called 
the New Right. Among these were direct-mail fundraiser Richard Viguerie 
and political strategists Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, and John “Terry” 
6 Eric Laurent, Bush’s Secret World (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), p. 13. 
7 Jerome L. Himmelstein, To The Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism (Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 1990), p. 139.
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Dolan. The New Right was deeply disappointed with the failure of Presi-
dents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford to turn American politics away from 
the New Deal-Great Society trajectory. Richard Viguerie has referred to 
President Ford’s appointment of former New York Governor Nelson Rock-
efeller as his vice-president as the moment that launched the New Right 
network. Viguerie has noted that “[t]he Republican party is like a disabled 
tank on a bridge we have to cross. The only way we’re going to cross the 
bridge is to take the tank and shove it into the river.”8
The conservative groups needed access to politicians in order to influence 
the enactment of new legislation. One of the key lawmakers of the 1970s 
and 1980s was Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, whose 
work Tom Packer describes in his article. In several ways Senator Helms 
was the link between the strategists of the New Right and the conservatives 
in Congress. He had a large congressional staff that operated a mailing list 
that helped him raise substantial amounts of money for his reelection cam-
paigns and for the campaigns of other conservatives. Packer discusses how 
Helms helped shape the foreign-policy views of the conservative move-
ment. Packer argues that there were several principles that influenced his 
foreign-policy opinions, such as the notion that there should be no limits 
to American sovereignty, and Packer claims that Helms was a proponent of 
nationalist unilateralism. Helms played a leading role in the opposition of 
conservatives to the Panama Canal Treaties, which President Jimmy Carter 
signed in 1977. According to Packer, Helms was not an isolationist, but he 
rejected the view that international institutions had authority and legitimacy 
to curb American foreign-policy initiatives.   
The conservatism of the New Right has been compared to a “three-
legged stool.” Above we have referred to the economic and military legs. 
The third leg is social conservatism. The New Right was deeply troubled by 
the women’s liberation and feminism of the late 1960s and 1970s and ar-
gued that this development threatened the traditional family. Feminism was 
connected to rising divorce rates, and absent fathers were blamed for the in-
creasing crime rate and fragmentation of society. In her article Hilde Løvdal 
Stephens discusses evangelical parenting in light of the new expertise on 
8 Richard Viguerie, quoted in Pat Ordonensky, “The New Right: Viguerie Is Its ‘Godfather’ as It Aims at 
Replacing the GOP,” The Palm Beach Post-Times, March 7, 1976. See also Alf Tomas Tønnessen, How 
Two Political Entrepreneurs Helped Create the American Conservative Movement, 1973-1981: The Ideas 
of Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2009).
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upbringing, epitomized by the work of psychologist James Dobson and his 
organization Focus on the Family, founded in 1977. Dobson criticized per-
missiveness in upbringing and urged parents to discipline their children. He 
was an advocate of traditional general roles and emphasized the role of the 
father in being a spiritual leader at home.
Løvdal Stephens points out that public schools became a battleground for 
evangelical parents who were critical of the secular values of schools that 
diverged from their own values. Sex education was one contentious issue that 
energized evangelicals, who feared that this education would challenge the 
belief in abstinence before marriage. Comprehensive sex education was an-
other big blow to evangelicals who had been horrified by the Supreme Court 
decisions that ruled school prayer (Engel v. Vitale, 1962) and devotional Bible 
reading in schools (Abington v. Schempp, 1962) unconstitutional.
Løvdal Stephens’ article can be read within the context of the rise of the 
Religious Right. Since the end of the Second World War there had been a 
major increase in membership of conservative Protestant denominations and 
a decline in membership among liberal and mainline denominations. The 
period between the mid-term elections of 1978 and the elections of 1980 is 
important for the rightward turn of the Republican Party because of the rise 
of the Religious Right and the increasing awareness of social issues. Abor-
tion became a key social issue for the Religious Right. It was a new issue 
for evangelicals. Conservative groups such as the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion and Christianity Today had expressed support for therapeutic abortion 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court 
ruling that legalized abortion, was initially not a major concern because 
many evangelicals believed the ruling protected the privacy of the patient 
and the doctor’s office from invasive government regulations. Moreover, 
it was seen as a Catholic question and not a Protestant issue. But by the 
end of the 1970s, evangelicals turned against abortion, largely thanks to 
the intellectual leader of the newly politically aware evangelicals, Francis 
Schaeffer, whose book How Then Should We Live (1976), and later book 
and documentary Whatever Happened to the Human Race? (1979), would 
awaken conservative Protestants such as the Reverend Jerry Falwell and his 
Moral Majority to the cause of ending abortion.9
9 See e.g. Barry Hankins, Francis Schaeffer and the Shaping of Evangelical America (Grand Rapids: Eerd-
mans, 2008) and Susan Friend Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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But the issue that made evangelicals organize politically was the threat 
by the Internal Revenue Service to withdraw tax-exemption of private 
schools that could not document an effort to prevent discrimination of mi-
norities. Many Christian private schools had been established in the South 
in the years after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision. If the IRS 
plan were to take effect, the private schools would have to increase tuition 
considerably. This issue did not generate much attention in the media, but 
evangelicals were outraged and mobilized against the IRS. According to 
Richard Viguerie, the announcement “kicked the sleeping dog. It galva-
nized the religious right. It was the spark that ignited the religious right’s 
involvement in real politics.”10 The IRS received more than 120,000 letters 
of protest, and after a congressional subcommittee had held several days of 
hearing about the issue, the IRS decided not to carry out the plans.11 This 
decision was interpreted as a victory for evangelicals, and it is one of the 
factors that inspired church leaders to become more strongly involved in 
politics. In 1979 Jerry Falwell launched the Moral Majority.
The rise of the Religious Right was a threat to moderates within the Repub-
lican Party. The Ripon Society, a group of northern moderates, was critical of 
the policy of some conservatives to oppose the Equal Rights Amendment and 
support a constitutional ban on abortions. Howard Gillette, a former president 
of the Ripon Society, left the GOP due to the nomination of Ronald Reagan in 
1980. Illinois Congressman John Anderson left the party to run as an indepen-
dent. He disapproved of the new emphasis on social issues that evangelicals 
had brought to the fore.  The historian Geoffrey Kabaservice compares the 
departure of progressives in 1980 with the “Bull Moose bolt” in 1912, when 
Theodore Roosevelt challenged President William Taft, but he argues that the 
departure in 1980 was not as dramatic as the one in 1912, but “the net effect in 
both cases was to shift the GOP center of gravity to the right.”12
The historian Sean Wilentz refers to the period from the mid-1970s until 
2008 as the Age of Reagan.13 During this period conservatives experienced 
10 Richard Viguerie, telephone interview with Thomas B. Edsall, January 17, 1990; quoted in Thomas B. 
Edsall with Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 132.
11 William Martin, With God On Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: Broadway 
Books, 1996), p. 172.
12 Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican 
Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 358, 362.
13 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).
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a significant number of legislative successes. Among the most important 
ones are the tax cuts of 1981, 2001, and 2003. The three decades were 
characterized by economic growth, but also widening economic inequality. 
Many jobs in manufacturing were outsourced, and these were replaced by 
service sector jobs that often paid significantly less.
The Republican capture of both congressional chambers in 1994 had a 
significant impact on the presidency of Bill Clinton. Even though Clinton 
was a moderate associated with the Democratic Leadership Council, he 
arguably moved further towards the center of the political spectrum than 
he would have done if Democrats had retained control of Congress. During 
his last six years as president he signed a number of conservative policy 
proposals, including the 1996 welfare reform, which replaced the New 
Deal-program Aid to Families with Dependent Children with Temporary 
Aid to Needy Families and devolved the responsibility to the states. He 
also signed the 1997 tax reform that reduced taxes on capital gains to a rate 
of twenty percent.14 This was a major tax relief for the richest Americans. 
Finally, President Clinton supported the 1999 Financial Services Modern-
ization Act that repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that had separated 
investment banks and commercial banks. The emergence of banks that 
were “too big to fail” would be one of the factors that led to the financial 
crisis of 2008.15
The Age of Reagan has also been characterized by the so-called cul-
ture wars that have intensified due to the rise of both new right-wing and 
left-wing media. The culture wars are not only about religious issues, but 
also attitudes towards guns and a dispute about the correct interpretation 
of the Second Amendment. Cultural issues often divide urban and rural 
America. Leif Magne Lervik explains that the gun issue is highly emotional 
and separates advocates of gun control and gun rights. It is difficult to find 
policies of compromise that both groups can live with. This polarization is 
reflected in important decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
took a rightward turn in the Age of Reagan and became very different from 
the Warren Court of the 1950s and 1960s. After Samuel Alito replaced San-
dra Day O’Connor on the bench in 2005, the Roberts Court became more 
reliably conservative than the Rehnquist Court had been. 
14 Tim Dickinson, “How the GOP Became the Party of the Rich,” Rolling Stone, Nov. 10, 2011.
15 Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and 
Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 197.
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Lervik discusses the significance of the 5-4 decision in the 2008 case Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, in which the Supreme Court strengthened the right 
of individuals to own guns. Two years later in the McDonald v. City of Chicago 
decision the Supreme Court made Heller applicable to state and local govern-
ments. Lervik analyzes arguments in favor of and against guns on campuses 
in light of the Heller and McDonald decisions. He argues that the gun debate 
represents “battles of opposing cultures,” and that one aspect of disagreement 
between these cultures is a conflict about what constitutes safety.  
As the conservative wing of the Republican Party became more power-
ful in the Age of Reagan than it had been in the Age of Roosevelt (1932-
ca. 1978) there has been a strong emphasis on personal responsibility for 
one’s own economic well-being. In recent years this view is reflected in the 
budget proposals by Paul Ryan, chairman of the House Budget Commit-
tee. In the budget Ryan presented in 2011, he sought to reduce the national 
debt by about $4 trillion over a ten-year period, as Obama would, but in a 
remarkably different way. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has 
estimated that at least two-thirds of these cuts would affect programs for 
low-income Americans. Among these programs are Medicaid, Pell Grants 
for college students, food stamps, and low-income housing assistance.16 
Ryan presented a similar budget in April 2012, which President Obama 
condemned by asserting: “[d]isguised as a deficit-reduction plan, it’s really 
an attempt to impose a radical vision on our country. It’s nothing but thinly 
veiled social Darwinism.”17
Paul Ryan had certainly expected criticism from liberals, but he also re-
ceived negative comments from former advisors of conservative presidents. 
Bruce Bartlett, former Economic Committee executive director, senior fel-
low at the Heritage Foundation, and a senior policy analyst for President 
Reagan, has written that “[d]istributionally, the Ryan plan is a monstrosity. 
The rich would receive huge tax cuts while the social safety net would 
be shredded to pay for them.”18 The view of the GOP as the party of the 
rich and Mitt Romney’s infamous comment about the 47 percent hurt the 
Romney-Ryan ticket in the 2012 presidential election. 
16 Thomas B. Edsall, The Age of Austerity: How Scarcity Will Remake American Politics (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2012), pp. 166-167.
17 James Politi and Anna Fifield, “Obama hits out at ‘social Darwinism,’” Financial Times, April 3, 2012. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/547a2c14-7d59-11e1-bfa5-00144feab49a.html#axzz2D1wb2vud 
18 Edsall, The Age of Austerity, pp. 167-168
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In spite of this view the Republican Party currently appears to have a firm 
grip on the House of Representatives, partly because Republican supporters 
are more reliable voters in midterm elections and partly due to redistricting 
and gerrymandering after the 2010 national census. By contrast, in presi-
dential elections after 1988 a more demographically heterogeneous elector-
ate has made it more challenging for the GOP to receive a majority or plu-
rality of votes. The right-wing policies advocated by the Tea Party faction 
of the Republican Party, which have contributed to congressional gridlock, 
has limited national appeal. In decades to come American conservatism 
needs refinement and must appeal to more than a base of middle-aged and 
old white men in order for the Republican Party to preserve the legacy of 
the Age of Reagan and prevent a new generation of liberal reforms.
